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Corporate governance and accounting irregularities: Canadian evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Nadia Smaili

    () (University of Quebec in Montreal Business School)

  • Réal Labelle

    () (HEC Montréal)

Abstract

Abstract This study examines the extent to which corporate governance acts as an efficient means of protecting investors against accounting irregularities. It is grounded in the literatures on public enforcement of securities laws by market authorities, governance, and fraudulent financial statements. A unique feature of the Canadian tracking and enforcement system for reporting issuers in default is used to refine the definitions of accounting irregularities or fraudulent financial statements used in other studies. We test and find that the governance mechanisms of firms found in default of financial reporting regulations during the first 5 years of existence of the Canadian system are weak compared to a sample of no-default firms. For instance, they have fewer independent and financial expert directors on their boards and audit committees, are more prone to have recently changed auditor and to having their CEO as chair of the board. They also appear to fulfill their financing requirements through private rather than public funds, which is consistent with the fact that default firms are less likely to be in a position to return to the public market to fulfill their needs. This study offers evidence relevant to policy makers and others who are concerned with the potential role of market authorities and governance in protecting investors against accounting irregularities.

Suggested Citation

  • Nadia Smaili & Réal Labelle, 2016. "Corporate governance and accounting irregularities: Canadian evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(3), pages 625-653, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:20:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10997-015-9314-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-015-9314-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rafael Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006. "What Works in Securities Laws?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Governance; Accounting irregularity; Financial reporting quality; Fraudulent financial statement; Restatement; Regulation; Reporting issuer in default;

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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