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How Can a Cartel Be Detected?

  • Korbinian Blanckenburg

    ()

  • Alexander Geist

There is a long history of analyzing the workability of markets regarding concentration ratios as indicators of workability. In this paper, we discuss a comparatively new concept, the Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) Concept, introduced by Grossekettler ( 1982 , 1999 , 2005 , 2008 ). The CFD-concept analyzes real market processes by means of time series analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently or not. Furthermore, the concept can be used as a tool for detecting cartels. Therefore, we develop a System of Cartel Markers which can be used to analyze real markets. We analyze the German cement industry as an example of a cartel and find significant differences to the competitive benchmark. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2009

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11294-009-9235-6
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Article provided by International Atlantic Economic Society in its journal International Advances in Economic Research.

Volume (Year): 15 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 421-436

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Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:15:y:2009:i:4:p:421-436
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  1. Hackner, Jonas, 1994. "Collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 155-177, June.
  2. John Connor, 2005. "Collusion and price dispersion," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(6), pages 335-338.
  3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  4. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
  5. Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
  6. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816632, 1.
  7. Christian Lorenz, 2005. "Screening markets for cartel detection - collusive marker in the CFD cartel-audit," Industrial Organization 0511003, EconWPA.
  8. Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2005. "The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19164, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  9. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, 1.
  10. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June.
  11. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
  12. Grossekettler, Heinz, 2008. "Marktprozessbedingte Controllingaufgaben in Unternehmen," Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung 26, Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster.
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