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Tariftreuegesetze – kein Mittel zur Angleichung der Wettbewerbsbedingungen im Baugewerbe

Listed author(s):
  • Andrea Besenthal

Due to the increasing competition from abroad which is able to offer services for lower prices because of lower wage standards the stress of competition intensifies in Germany. With regard to West Germany the East German companies - paying lower wages – represent an immediate business competition. The supporter of the Tariftreuegesetze (laws concerning the construction industry which restrict public contracts only to contractors who pay union wages) see the laws` advantage in eliminating the existing differences in competitive conditions, which emerge from differences on the wage level. The IWH study concludes that the named wage laws do not seem necessary from an economic point of view.

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Article provided by Halle Institute for Economic Research in its journal Wirtschaft im Wandel.

Volume (Year): 10 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 42-46

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Handle: RePEc:iwh:iwhwiw:2-04-4
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