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An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games


  • Robert W. Rosenthal

    (Northwestern University)


An arbitration model for cooperative two-person normal-form games is suggested in which each player's strength is measured by what he can obtain through committing himself to a course of action before his opponent does. This approach differs from earlier models in which threats were evaluated on the basis of their relative effects on the two players. Possibilities for extensions to the n -player case are included.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "An Arbitration Model for Normal-Form Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 1(1), pages 82-88, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:1:y:1976:i:1:p:82-88
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.1.1.82

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    2. R. J. Aumann & M. Maschler, 1972. "Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 54-63, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rudolf Vetschera & Michael Filzmoser & Ronald Mitterhofer, 2014. "An Analytical Approach to Offer Generation in Concession-Based Negotiation Processes," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 71-99, January.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2018. "Anchoring on Utopia: a generalization of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 6(2), pages 141-155, October.
    3. Carmen Herrero, 1997. "Endogenous reference points and the adjusted proportional solution for bargaining problems with claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 113-119.
    4. Kalai, Ehud, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(7), pages 1623-1630, October.
    5. Jaume García Segarra & Miguel Ginés Vilar, 2011. "Weighted Proportional Losses Solution," ThE Papers 10/21, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    6. Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Jaume García-Segarra & Miguel Ginés-Vilar, 2019. "Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 215-224, March.
    8. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1975. "Induced Outcomes in Cooperative Normal-Form Games," Discussion Papers 178, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Emin Karagözoğlu & Kerim Keskin & Elif Özcan-Tok, 2019. "Between anchors and aspirations: a new family of bargaining solutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(1), pages 53-73, June.
    10. Barry O'Neill, 1982. "Comparison of Bargaining Solutions, Utilitarianism, and the Minimax Rule by their Effectiveness," Discussion Papers 521, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.


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