IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Union Competition and Strikes: The Need for an Analysis at the Sector Level

  • Agnes Akkerman
Registered author(s):

    International comparative research has found that strike incidence is higher where two or more unions bargain with an employer ("multi-unionism"), as is common in most European countries, than where only one union does, all else equal. Two proposed explanations for this relationship, both invoking inter-union rivalry as the main dynamic, are that under multi-unionism, unions (a) make propagandistic use of strikes to attract members, or (b) compete with each other by bidding up bargaining demands. To date, the evidence bearing on these hypotheses has been equivocal because, the author argues, researchers have focused on activity at the national level rather than at the lower levels that are more commonly the nexus for strike formation. The author performs empirical tests using industry-sector-level data for seven European countries for the years 1990-2006, and finds evidence clearly favoring the competitive bargaining hypothesis over the propaganda hypothesis.

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Article provided by ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School in its journal ILR Review.

    Volume (Year): 61 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 4 (July)
    Pages: 445-459

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:61:y:2008:i:4:p:445-459
    Contact details of provider: Fax: 607-255-8016
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
    Web: Email:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:61:y:2008:i:4:p:445-459. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ILR Review)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.