Living wages: Protection for or protection from low-wage workers?
Living wage laws are touted as anti-poverty measures. Yet they apply to only a small fraction of workers, most commonly covering only employers with city contracts. The apparent contradiction between broad anti-poverty goals and narrow coverage suggests that goals other than poverty reduction may partly underlie living wage campaigns. This paper considers the hypothesis that living wage laws act to maintain or increase rents among unionized municipal workers. By raising the wages that city contractors would have to pay, living wage laws may reduce the incentives for cities to contract out work that would otherwise be done by unionized municipal employees, hence increasing the bargaining power of municipal unions and leading to higher wages for their members. The evidence presented here, from an analysis of CPS data for 1996-2000, indicates that the wages of unionized municipal workers are indeed increased as a result of living wages covering contractors. (Free full-text download available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 58 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Fax: 607-255-8016|
Web page: http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901|
Web: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/ Email:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mincer, Jacob, 1976. "Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages S87-104, August.
- Leibenstein, Harvey, 1978. "On the Basic Proposition of X-Efficiency Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 328-32, May.
- David Neumark & Scott Adams, 2000.
"Do Living Wage Ordinances Reduce Urban Poverty?,"
NBER Working Papers
7606, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Lawrence F. Katz, 2001.
"Prevailing wage laws and construction labor markets,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 54(2), pages 259-274, January.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Lawrence Katz, 1999. "Prevailing Wage Laws and Construction Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 7454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel R. HOLLAS & Stanley R. STANSELL, 1994. "The Economic Efficiency Of Public Vs. Private Gas Distribution Utilities," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 281-300, 04.
- Brock, William A & Magee, Stephen P, 1978. "The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 246-50, May.
- Arunava Bhattacharyya & Elliott Parker & Kambiz Raffiee, 1994. "An Examination of the Effect of Ownership on the Relative Efficiency of Public and Private Water Utilities," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 70(2), pages 197-209.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:58:y:2004:i:1:p:27-51. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ILR Review)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.