Union rents as a source of takeover gains among target shareholders
This paper tests the hypothesis that the substantial gains enjoyed by shareholders in target firms during the corporate acquisition boom of the 1980s reflected, in part, shareholders' recouping of the value of "rents" (in the form of wage premiums, higher fringe benefits, and constraints on managerial authority) held by unionized labor. Analyzing data on the merger and acquisition experience of nearly 300 large publicly traded target firms during the period 1982-86, the author finds, consistent with that hypothesis, that shareholders' average returns from takeover activity were higher in unionized target firms (41%) than in nonunion target firms (35%). For unionized workers, these effects are equivalent to an annualized employee "loss" approaching 8% of annual earnings, or 50% of the wage premium conventionally associated with union coverage. (Abstract courtesy JSTOR.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 49 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Fax: 607-255-8016|
Web page: http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: 381 Ives East, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-3901|
Web: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/ Email:
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ilr:articl:v:49:y:1995:i:1:p:3-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ILR Review)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.