Who "wins" in wage bargaining?
Tests the "split the difference" bargaining model by examining data on the parties' opening and final positions with respect to wages in various negotiations concluded between September 1968 and December 1970. Difficulty with the model proposed by John Nash; Possibilities that emerged. (Abstract copyright EBSCO.)
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Volume (Year): 26 (1973)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
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