IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Technological Performance: A Comparison Of Domestic And Foreign Firms In Indian Industries After Liberalization


  • T J Joseph


This paper analyzes the extent to which the presence of multinational firms helps in technological capability building in Indian manufacturing industries, by comparing the technological performance of around 1800 domestic and foreign-owned firms in various industry groups after the liberalization of the economy in 1991. The technological performance has been captured using four technological indicators, viz., R&D intensity, export intensity, capital goods import intensity, and technology licensing intensity. The results show that there has been a substantial growth in the R&D intensity and export intensity of domestic-owned manufacturing firms in India after the liberalization. However, while the export intensity showed a slight upward trend for the foreign firms, the R&D intensity was more or less stagnant. The study also finds that the dependence on technology imports, either through embodied or disembodied channel, is declining. The results indicate that the technological capability building by both domestic and foreign firms is more industry-specific.

Suggested Citation

  • T J Joseph, 2006. "Technological Performance: A Comparison Of Domestic And Foreign Firms In Indian Industries After Liberalization," The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics, IUP Publications, vol. 0(2), pages 38-63, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:icf:icfjme:v:04:y:2006:i:2:p:38-63

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The Interdependence between Ownership Status and Market Structure: The Case of Privatization," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 57(227), pages 319-328, August.
    2. Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1989. "The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 283-301, April.
    3. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2001. "Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: an irrelevance result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-5.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    5. Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1991. "Mixed oligopoly with differentiated products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-53, March.
    6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2002:i:1:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    8. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    9. Richard G. Harris & Elmer G. Wiens, 1980. "Government Enterprise: An Instrument for the Internal Regulation of Industry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(1), pages 125-132, February.
    10. Hugo Sonnenschein, 1968. "The Dual of Duopoly Is Complementary Monopoly: or, Two of Cournot's Theories Are One," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 316-316.
    11. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
    12. White, Mark D., 1996. "Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 189-195, November.
    13. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Productive efficiency in public and private firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 15-30, January.
    14. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1998. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 473-483, December.
    15. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, January.
    16. Fershtman, Chaim, 1985. "Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 245-253, June.
    17. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-311, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:icf:icfjme:v:04:y:2006:i:2:p:38-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (G R K Murty). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.