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Betriebe und Frühverrentung: Angebote, die man nicht ablehnt (Firms and early retirement: offers that one does not refuse )

Author

Listed:
  • Bellmann, Lutz

    () (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany])

  • Janik, Florian

    () (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany])

Abstract

"In many countries early retirement has become a personnel strategy. The establishments are interested in hiring younger employees and try to avoid 'deferred payments' which arise if older employees are paid above their productivity. Firms enter into contracts with their employees that include clauses about early retirement. In response to demand or technological shocks, workers receive retirement offers from their employers which cannot be rejected by rational actors. Using the IAB Establishment Panel 2003-2006, the relation between indicators of demand and technological shocks and the incidence and quantity of early retirements is analyzed. Thus, our findings suggest that firms' personnel policies affect the employees' decisions about early retirement." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))

Suggested Citation

  • Bellmann, Lutz & Janik, Florian, 2010. "Betriebe und Frühverrentung: Angebote, die man nicht ablehnt (Firms and early retirement: offers that one does not refuse )," Zeitschrift für ArbeitsmarktForschung - Journal for Labour Market Research, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany], vol. 42(4), pages 311-324.
  • Handle: RePEc:iab:iabzaf:v:2010:i:4:p:311-324
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stern, Steven, 1987. "Promotion and Optimal Retirement," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages 107-123, October.
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