Distributive Justice in International Environmental Policy: Axiomatic Foundation and Exemplary Formulation
Proceeding on a limited number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, we develop a proposal for distributing common resources. In particular, the proposed fair division mechanism is individually rational, envy-free, Pareto-efficient and satisfies the stand alone test, which follows as a minimum requirement from the resource and population monotonicity criteria. Applied to international climate policy, the thrust of this proposal is that the South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas abatement measures it is to undertake as a result of efficiency considerations.
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