Determinants of board and audit committee meeting frequency
Purpose - This purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of board and audit committee meeting frequency. Design/methodology/approach - The determinants studied are related to the ownership structure and to the board characteristics. The study is conducted in an agency setting featured by high ownership concentration and large insider shareholders. Hypotheses are developed based on agency theory. The empirical evidence is provided by a sample of Italian listed companies. Negative binomial regression is used in the multivariate analysis to test the relationships. Robustness checks provide further empirical support. Findings - The paper finds that insider ownership negatively impacts – either on the board or on the audit committee meeting frequency – whilst the proportion of independent directors in the board has a positive impact. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that insider ownership and board independent monitoring are substitute control mechanisms. The findings also show that audit committees are more active in larger firms. Originality/value - The paper provides an agency theory-based explanation of the board and the audit committee meeting frequency, in a setting featured by large controlling shareholders.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 26 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.emeraldinsight.com|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Emerald Group Publishing, Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley, BD16 1WA, UK|
Web: http://emeraldgrouppublishing.com/products/journals/journals.htm?id=maj Email:
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mohd Hassan Che Haat, 2008. "Corporate governance, transparency and performance of Malaysian companies," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 23(8), pages 744-778, September.
- Eng, L. L. & Mak, Y. T., 2003. "Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 325-345.
- Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2004.
"Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 537-600, 04.
- Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2002. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," CEPR Discussion Papers 3177, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2002. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," NBER Working Papers 8711, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
- Shleifer, Andrei & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2002. "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 3-27, October.
- Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000. "Investor Protection and Equity Markets," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1906, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenson, 2000. "Investor Protection and Equity Markets," NBER Working Papers 7974, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Collier, Paul & Gregory, Alan, 1999. "Audit committee activity and agency costs," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4-5), pages 311-332.
- Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April.
- Volpin, Paolo, 2002. "Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Boone, Audra L. & Casares Field, Laura & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & Raheja, Charu G., 2007. "The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 66-101, July.
- Linck, James S. & Netter, Jeffry M. & Yang, Tina, 2008. "The determinants of board structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 308-328, February.
- Carlos Fernández Méndez & Rubén Arrondo García, 2007. "The Effects of Ownership Structure and Board Composition on the Audit Committee Meeting Frequency: Spanish evidence," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 909-922, 09.
- Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-148.
- Fabrizio Cerbioni & Antonio Parbonetti, 2007. "Exploring the Effects of Corporate Governance on Intellectual Capital Disclosure: An Analysis of European Biotechnology Companies," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 791-826.
- Fan, Joseph P. H. & Wong, T. J., 2002. "Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 401-425, August.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 2007. "Private placements and managerial entrenchment," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 461-484, September.
- Roberto Di Pietra & Christos Grambovas & Ivana Raonic & Angelo Riccaboni, 2008. "The effects of board size and ‘busy’ directors on the market value of Italian companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(1), pages 73-91, March.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
- White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
- Menon, Krishnagopal & Deahl Williams, Joanne, 1994. "The use of audit committees for monitoring," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 121-139.
- Marie Chavent & Yuan Ding & Linghui Fu & Herve Stolowy & Huiwen Wang, 2006. "Disclosure and determinants studies: An extension using the Divisive Clustering Method (DIV)," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 181-218.
- Yuan Ding & Hervé Stolowy & Linghui Fu & Huiwen Wang, 2004. "Disclosure and determinants studies: An extension using the divisive clustering method (DIV)," Working Papers hal-00587233, HAL.
- Marie Chavent & Yuan Ding & L. Fu & Hervé Stolowy & H. Wang, 2006. "Disclosure and Determinants Studies: An Extension Using the Divisive Clustering Method (DIV)," Post-Print hal-00200812, HAL.
- Hervé Stolowy & Yuan Ding & Marie Chavent & L. Fu & H. Wang, 2006. "Disclosure and Determinants Studies: An Extension Using the Divisive Clustering Method (DIV)," Post-Print halshs-00119585, HAL.
- DING, Yuan & STOLOWY, Hervé & FU, Linghui & WANG, Huiwen, 2004. "Disclosure and determinants studies : an extension using the divisive clustering method (DIV)," Les Cahiers de Recherche 798, HEC Paris.
- Florence Depoers, 2000. "A cost benefit study of voluntary disclosure: some empirical evidence from French listed companies," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 245-263. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eme:majpps:v:26:y:2011:i:3:p:208-229. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Virginia Chapman)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.