Fighting corruption: an expectation augmented approach
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role of expectation in fighting corruption in a society. Design/methodology/approach – The methodology is analytical in nature, drawing evidence from the Quran, Hadith and Seerah. It has a strong theoretical basis on the role of expectation in eliciting desirable response. Findings – The paper suggests that a continuous disregard to corruption-reducing impact of the revealed ethics would always lead to a suboptimal anti-corruption policy and exacerbate a drifting pressure to locally stable corruption equilibrium. Research limitations/implications – The paper focuses on the role of expectation at micro level, a macroeconomic perspective can be a good research effort. Also, due to the paucity of data as a result of the nature of the topic being investigated, new research can further investigate this issue empirically. Practical implications – Potential outcome of this paper is to stem the wave of corruption through revealed ethics or God consciousness which is relatively easier to administer and less costly, since reform effort is internally supported not externally imposed. Social implications – This paper would positively impact on the society, by stemming the upsurge of corruption through religious ethics. It further allocates a greater role to the society in curbing corruption through the revealed ethics. This paper would positively influence public attitudes towards corruption, hence improve the quality of. Originality/value – The paper is novel, in that it applies an economic theory to solving a social menace. It further optimally combines both conventional economic theory with revealed religious teachings and argues that both may not conflict if properly understood or properly applied. The paper is a necessary bridge between Western perspective and Islamic Position, more importantly now that the world is looking for a viable alternative to the inadequacies of the conventional Western perspectives. JEL classification: D01, D73, D84, Z12
Volume (Year): 28 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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