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Recidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1990-2009

Author

Listed:
  • John M. Connor

Abstract

High rates of or rising trends in recidivism is evidence that enforcement of a criminal law is failing. John Connor (Purdue Univ.)

Suggested Citation

  • John M. Connor, 2010. "Recidivism Revealed: Private International Cartels 1990-2009," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 6.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:6.2.2010:i=5735
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2013. "Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 987-1022, December.
    2. Catarina Marvão, 2016. "The EU Leniency Programme and Recidivism," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(1), pages 1-27, February.
    3. repec:eee:indorg:v:56:y:2018:i:c:p:1-25 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Artiga González, Tanja & Schmid, Markus & Yermack, David, 2013. "Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?," Working Papers on Finance 1309, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Sep 2017.
    5. Tanja Artiga González & Markus Schmid & David Yermack, 2013. "Smokescreen: How Managers Behave When They Have Something To Hide," NBER Working Papers 18886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Duc Duy Nguyen & Jens Hagendorff & Arman Eshraghi, 2016. "Can Bank Boards Prevent Misconduct?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-36.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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