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Will Europe Provide Effective Redress for Cartel Victims?


  • Vincent Smith


This article gives an overview of the history of the development of private redress for competition law breaches in Europe. The article begins by reviewing the current proposals to improve private actions, examines the areas where further development is still required, and makes some suggestions as to how to tackle the most important of these. The issues discussed include how to determine which court should hear competition claims, how to institute a process that does not result in a multiplicity of actions across the European Union, and what system would ensure that claimants achieve effective redress while also being fair to defendants.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Smith, 2008. "Will Europe Provide Effective Redress for Cartel Victims?," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 4.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:4.2.2008:i=5150

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    References listed on IDEAS

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