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The Economics of Loyalty Rebates and Antitrust Law in the United States

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  • Bruce Kobayashi

Abstract

The courts’ treatment of loyalty discounts under U.S. antitrust laws is broadly consistent with an approach that recognizes the high costs of erroneously condemning behavior that would lower prices and increase welfare, and the speculative nature of the anticompetitive harm that might result.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Kobayashi, 2005. "The Economics of Loyalty Rebates and Antitrust Law in the United States," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 1.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:1.2.2005:i=4881
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sloev, Igor, 2007. "Market Share Discounts and Investment Incentives," MPRA Paper 13990, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Frank Maier-Rigaud & Ulrich Schwalbe, 2013. "Do Retroactive Rebates Imply Lower Prices for Consumers?," Working Papers 2013-ECO-10, IESEG School of Management.
    3. Liliane Karlinger & Massimo Motta, 2007. "Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates When Scale Matters," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/30, European University Institute.
    4. Nicholas Economides, 2014. "Bundling and Tying," Working Papers 14-22, NET Institute.
    5. Caminal, Ramon & Claici, Adina, 2007. "Are loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes anti-competitive?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 657-674, August.
    6. David E. Mills, 2017. "Inducing Cooperation with a Carrot Instead of a Stick," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 50(2), pages 245-261, March.
    7. Roman Inderst & Greg Shaffer, 2010. "Market‐share contracts as facilitating practices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 709-729, December.
    8. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2011. "Vertical Limit pricing," Working Papers 1104E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    9. Joshua Wright, 2011. "Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 38(4), pages 387-404, June.
    10. Rastislav Funta, 2014. "Discounts and their Effects – Economic and Legal Approach," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 4, pages 277-285, December.
    11. Adrian Majumdar & Greg Shaffer, 2007. "Market-Share Contracts with Asymmetric Information," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2007-17, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    12. Janusz Ordover & Greg Shaffer, 2007. "Exclusionary Discounts," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2007-13, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

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