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How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting: Comment

Author

Listed:
  • Assaf Eilat
  • Jith Jayaratne
  • Janusz Ordover
  • Greg Shaffer

Abstract

The academic literature on loyalty discounts and exclusive dealing demonstrates that the welfare effects of these practices are ambiguous and that market details determine the direction of the effect. Assaf Eilat, Jith Jayaratne, Janusz Ordover (Compass Lexecon) & Greg Shaffer (University of Rochester)

Suggested Citation

  • Assaf Eilat & Jith Jayaratne & Janusz Ordover & Greg Shaffer, 2010. "How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting: Comment," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 4.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpi:atchrn:4.1.2010:i=5508
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    Cited by:

    1. Elhauge, Einer & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2015. "Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 111-121.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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