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Corporate governance in the UK : contrasted with the US system

  • Julian Franks
  • Colin Mayer

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/ZS/ZS-CESifo_Forum/zs-for-2002/zs-for-2002-3/Forum302-focus3.pdf
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Article provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its journal CESifo Forum.

Volume (Year): 3 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 13-22

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Handle: RePEc:ces:ifofor:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:13-22
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  1. Romano, Roberta, 1991. "The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 55-87, Spring.
  2. Colin Mayer & Julian Franks, 2001. "Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?," Economics Series Working Papers 1999-FE-01, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Loughran, Tim & Vijh, Anand M, 1997. " Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from Corporate Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 1765-90, December.
  4. Dow, James & Raposo, Clara, 2002. "Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3309, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
  6. Jennifer E. Bethel & Julia Porter Liebeskind & Tim Opler, 1998. "Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 605-634, 04.
  7. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 943-77.
  8. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1988. "The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations : An exploratory analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 317-346, January.
  9. Amar Bhide, 1989. "The Causes And Consequences Of Hostile Takeovers," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 2(2), pages 36-59.
  10. Kaplan, Steven N. & Reishus, David, 1990. "Outside directorships and corporate performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 389-410, October.
  11. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
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