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Financial Regulation and the Grabbing Hand

  • Florian Buck

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    Article provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its journal DICE.

    Volume (Year): 11 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 4 (01)
    Pages: 03-13

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    Handle: RePEc:ces:ifodic:v:11:y:2014:i:4:p:03-13
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    1. Dyck, Alexander & Moss, David & Zingales, Luigi, 2008. "Media versus Special Interests," CEPR Discussion Papers 6994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
    3. Richard J. Herring, 2011. "The Capital Conundrum," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(4), pages 171-187, December.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Yaron Leitner, 2005. "Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Private Sector Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2925-2953, December.
    6. Webb, Steven B., 1982. "Agricultural Protection in Wilhelminian Germany: Forging an Empire with Pork and Rye," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(02), pages 309-326, June.
    7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working papers 506, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    8. Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2007. "The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century," NBER Working Papers 12851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Enrico C. Perotti & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2006. "The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 145-174, February.
    10. Martin Hellwig, 2010. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 8(2), pages 40-46, 07.
    11. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    12. Luc Laeven, 2004. "The Political Economy of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 201-224, December.
    13. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1982. "Kinked utility and the demand for human wealth and liability insurance," Munich Reprints in Economics 19909, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    14. Carr, Jack L & Mathewson, G Frank, 1988. "Unlimited Liability as a Barrier to Entry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 766-84, August.
    15. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    16. Blau, Benjamin M. & Brough, Tyler J. & Thomas, Diana W., 2013. "Corporate lobbying, political connections, and the bailout of banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3007-3017.
    17. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521810203 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Eisert, Tim & Eufinger, Christian, 2013. "Interbank network and bank bailouts: Insurance mechanism for non-insured creditors?," SAFE Working Paper Series 10, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    19. Raghuram G. Rajan & Rodney Ramcharan, 2011. "Land and Credit: A Study of the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th Century," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(6), pages 1895-1931, December.
    20. Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 1963. "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number frie63-1, May.
    21. Stephen Nunez, 2004. "Bankruptcy "Reform" in Congress: Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(2), pages 527-557, October.
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