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New Evidence on the Politics and Economics of Multiparty Cabinets Duration

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  • Carmignani, Fabrizio

Abstract

A Proportional Hazards Specification for cabinet duration data is estimated by mean of a flexible parametric approach. The hazard rate is found to be significantly affected by the majority status, the degree of fragmentation and ideological homogeneity of the coalition, the stability and the polarisation of the legislature and the time horizon at the moment of cabinet formation. Interesting innovative results concern the higher stability of cabinets supported by coalitions ideologically closer to the median party and/or left-oriented. The overall state of the economy also has a role. Graphical evidence suggests that the underlying distribution of duration data might be a Gompertz distribution. Copyright 2002 by Scottish Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmignani, Fabrizio, 2002. "New Evidence on the Politics and Economics of Multiparty Cabinets Duration," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 49(3), pages 249-279, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:3:p:249-79
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    Cited by:

    1. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2000. "Political Bias in Fiscal Policy Formation: an Econometric Analysis of Coalition Systems," Working Papers 28, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2000.
    2. Fabrizio Carmignani & Emilio Colombo & Patrizio Tirelli, 2004. "Consistency versus credibility: how do countries choose their exchange rate regime?," Working Papers 85, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005.
    3. Colombo, Emilio & Tirelli, Patrizio & Visser, Jelle, 2014. "Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 358-374.
    4. Martin Gassebner & Richard Jong‐A‐Pin & Jochen O. Mierau, 2011. "Terrorism And Cabinet Duration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1253-1270, November.
    5. Burke Paul J., 2012. "Economic Growth and Political Survival," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-43, March.
    6. Cáceres, Neila & Malone, Samuel W., 2013. "Forecasting leadership transitions around the world," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 575-591.
    7. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2003. "Political Instability, Uncertainty and Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 1-54, February.
    8. Carmignani, Fabrizio & Colombo, Emilio & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2008. "Exploring different views of exchange rate regime choice," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(7), pages 1177-1197, November.
    9. Carmignani, Fabrizio, 2009. "The distributive effects of institutional quality when government stability is endogenous," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 409-421, December.

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