Cabinet Formation in Coalition Systems
Theoretical and empirical issues concerning the political bargaining process over cabinet formation in coalition systems are addressed in this paper. A set of theoretical predictions is tested using a sample of 13 western European countries observed throughout the period 1950-995. It appears that the formation delay is increasing in the degree of ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners and that the share of portfolios secured by the formateur is decreasing in the degree of complexity of the bargaining environment. A few factors affecting the degree to which the outcome of the negotiation process can be defined as balanced are also identified. Copyright 2001 by Scottish Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 48 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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