International and Intergenerational Environmental Externalities
The authors examine a world in which policymakers' actions in a given country at a given time have long-lived effects on a common resource: the global environment. They consider the first best in which long-lived planners behave cooperatively, then examine the allocation of resources when there is noncooperation across countries, across time, or both. Finally the authors analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy along balanced growth paths. It is found that, while long-lived international institutions are necessary to internalize all externalities, cooperation at a point in time may be harmful to future generations. Copyright 1997 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Volume (Year): 99 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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