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Involuntary Unemployment and Environmental Policy: The Double Dividend Hypothesis

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  • Schneider, Kerstin

Abstract

An environmental tax reform might bring about gains over and above improved environmental quality. In particular, if tax revenues from environmental taxes are used to reduce the tax on wage income, positive employment effects can result in second-best economies. An efficiency wage model is used to analyze the impact of an ecological tax reform on involuntary unemployment. The government controls emissions by selling emission permits. Employment of labor and wages are determined endogenously. Conditions are identified under which an environmental tax reform reduces unemployment and increases welfare. Copyright 1997 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

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  • Schneider, Kerstin, 1997. " Involuntary Unemployment and Environmental Policy: The Double Dividend Hypothesis," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(1), pages 45-49, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:99:y:1997:i:1:p:45-49
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