Export Subsidies as Signals of Competitiveness
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- Matschke, Xenia, 2003. "Tariff and quota equivalence in the presence of asymmetric information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 209-223, October.
- Furusawa, Taiji & Higashida, Keisaku & Ishikawa, Jota, 2003. "What information is needed for welfare-enhancing policies under international oligopoly?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 31-46, January.
- Matloob Piracha, 2004. "Export Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Under Asymmetric Information," Studies in Economics 0410, School of Economics, University of Kent.
- Hisashi Sawaki, 2010. "Interaction Between Monetary And Fiscal Authorities Under Incomplete Information," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 202-217.
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- repec:kea:keappr:ker-20190101-35-1-06 is not listed on IDEAS
- Pei-Cheng Liao, 2014. "Input Prices as Signals of Costs to a Downstream Rival and Customer," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 414-430, September.
- Bouët, Antoine & Cassagnard, Patrice, 2013. "Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 286-293.
- Hisashi Sawaki, 2015. "Educating voters for protection," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(7), pages 906-921, October.
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