Allocation of Capital and Labor in a Labor-Owned Firm Consisting of Heterogeneous Workers
This paper focuses on conflicts that may arise in a labor-owned firm consisting of heterogeneous workers. The firm is financed by vote-carrying shares held by the worker-members. Collusive decisions on income sharing and recruitment policy are analyzed. In another separate stage, it is shown how individual workers' supplies of labor and capital depend on characteristics such as their attitudes towards risk. On the basis of these analyses, conditions for unanimous decision-making are discussed. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Volume (Year): 90 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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