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Hedonic Prices, Property Values and Measuring Environmental Benefits: A Survey of the Issues

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  • Freeman, A Myrick, III

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  • Freeman, A Myrick, III, 1979. " Hedonic Prices, Property Values and Measuring Environmental Benefits: A Survey of the Issues," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(2), pages 154-173.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:81:y:1979:i:2:p:154-73
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