Is Environmental Dumping Greater When Plants Are Footloose?
We address concerns that globalisation gives national governments incentives to set weak environmental policies and that these incentives are particularly strong in industries where plants are footloose. Using a simple model of imperfect competition, we compare the environmental policies that would be set by non-cooperative governments for two different move structures--where governments set environmental policies after firms decide where to locate (market share game) and where governments set environmental policies before firms decide where to locate (location game). We show that the extent of environmental dumping in the market share game can be greater than in the location game. Copyright 2001 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 103 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0347-0520|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:103:y:2001:i:4:p:673-88. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.