Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy-Making and Politics
The costs and benefits of cooperative monetary and fiscal policy are analysed in the framework of a partisan business-cycles model. It is shown that political parties with different ideologies prefer to choose different arrangements for macroeconomic policy-making. More specifically, right-wing parties favour independent central banks more than left-wing parties. An independent central bank is also the generally preferred option from a social welfare point of view. In addition, the form of policy-making arrangements between the fiscal and monetary authorities is shown to influence the extent of partisan cycles. Copyright 2000 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
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Volume (Year): 102 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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References listed on IDEAS
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