Intergenerational Altruism and the Environment
We construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady-state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite individuals' altruism, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal. We thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized. Copyright 2000 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 102 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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