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Residential Mobility and the Housing Market in a Two-Sector Neoclassical Growth Model


  • Hardman, Anna M
  • Ioannides, Yannis M


The impact of residential mobility and competitive housing markets on long-run growth is examined using a two-sector general equilibrium overlapping-generations model in continuous time. There is an infinity of agents with finite lives who adjust their housing consumption by moving, which is costly. The authors explore the model's steady-state properties, first with a free housing market and then under rent control when the market clears through restrictions on the frequency of moves. Rent controls do not just reduce welfare; they may increase the steady-state capital-labor ratio. Copyright 1999 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

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  • Hardman, Anna M & Ioannides, Yannis M, 1999. " Residential Mobility and the Housing Market in a Two-Sector Neoclassical Growth Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(2), pages 315-335, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:101:y:1999:i:2:p:315-35

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    Cited by:

    1. Seko, Miki & Sumita, Kazuto, 2007. "Effects of government policies on residential mobility in Japan: Income tax deduction system and the Rental Act," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-188, June.
    2. Blair Jenkins, 2009. "Rent Control: Do Economists Agree?," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 6(1), pages 73-112, January.
    3. Svarer, Michael & Rosholm, Michael & Munch, Jakob Roland, 2005. "Rent control and unemployment duration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2165-2181, December.
    4. Juan S. Mora, 2009. "A Characterization of the Judicial System in Spain: Analysis with Formalism Indices," Working Papers 2009-23, FEDEA.
    5. Milyo, Jeffrey, 2000. "A problem with Euclidean preferences in spatial models of politics," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 179-182, February.
    6. Miki Seko & Kazuto Sumita & Michio Naoi, 2012. "Residential Mobility Decisions in Japan: Effects of Housing Equity Constraints and Income Shocks under the Recourse Loan System," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 63-87, June.
    7. Aida Caldera Sánchez & Dan Andrews, 2011. "To Move or not to Move: What Drives Residential Mobility Rates in the OECD?," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 846, OECD Publishing.
    8. Munch, Jakob Roland & Svarer, Michael, 2002. "Rent control and tenancy duration," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 542-560, November.
    9. Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2012. "Is judicial inefficacy increasing the weight of the house property market in Spain? Evidence at the local level," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 339-365, September.
    10. Duebel, Hans-Joachim & Brzeski, W. Jan & Hamilton, Ellen, 2006. "Rental choice and housing policy realignment in transition : post-privatization challenges in the Europe and Central Asia region," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3884, The World Bank.
    11. Krol, Robert & Svorny, Shirley, 2005. "The effect of rent control on commute times," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 421-436, November.

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