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Preference Bias and Outsourcing to Market: A Steady-State Analysis

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  • Raymond Riezman
  • Ping Wang

Abstract

We analyze a model that focuses on the export/outsource decision. Outsourcing has the advantage of providing better information about local preferences. The disadvantage is that producing in the host country also means using the inferior technology embodied in the local capital. The decision of whether to offer an outsourcing contract weighs these two effects against each other. The host country accepts the outsourcing contract if the higher price they pay for the outsourced good is worth the benefit of consuming a manufactured good closer to their ideal variety. These results suggest that as low-income countries develop they become a more attractive destination for outsourcing because their capital grows to meet production needs and the local market is more lucrative. In addition, the developing low-income country finds the outsourcing contract more attractive since their increased demand for the correct variety of the manufactured good increases. This suggests that preference-based outsourcing is more likely to occur with higher-income host countries. Copyright 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Riezman & Ping Wang, 2009. "Preference Bias and Outsourcing to Market: A Steady-State Analysis," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(SI), pages 338-356, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:reviec:v:17:y:2009:i:si:p:338-356
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Hung-Ju, 2015. "Intellectual property rights and skills accumulation: A product-cycle model of FDI and outsourcing," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 328-343.
    2. Marjit, Sugata & Xu, Xinpeng & Yang, Lei, 2009. "Offshore Outsourcing, Contractual R&D and Intellectual Property in Developing Countries," MPRA Paper 19362, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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