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Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions

  • Peter Norman

Constrained efficient provision of an excludable public good is studied in amodel where preferences are private information. The provision level isasymptotically deterministic, making it possible to approximate the optimalmechanism with a mechanism that provides a fixed quantity of the goodand charges fixed user fees for access. In general, the fixed fees involvethird degree price discrimination, but, if names are uninformative aboutpreferences, the analysis provides a justification for average cost pricing. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.

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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 71 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 1163-1188

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Handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:4:p:1163-1188
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  1. Rob, Rafael, 1989. "Pollution claim settlements under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 307-333, April.
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  4. James A. Dearden, 1998. "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 189-198.
  5. Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 1997. "Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information," MPRA Paper 6549, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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  14. Riley, John & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1983. "Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 267-89, May.
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  16. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
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  18. Brito, Dagobert L & Oakland, William H, 1980. "On the Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 691-704, September.
  19. Neeman, Zvika, 1999. "Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 679-91, July.
  20. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
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