Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations
The author studies the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function, he first shows that all self-perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game must be core allocations although players make simultaneous demands for surplus and only on their own behalf. Following this, the author provides a sufficient condition under which the society eventually learns to divide the surplus according to some core allocation, regardless of the initial history. Copyright 1997 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Volume (Year): 64 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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References listed on IDEAS
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