An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms
This paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied ar e direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of the se processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity fea ture. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of the se results. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Volume (Year): 55 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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