Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
A symmetric allocation in a continuum is "multilaterally incentive compatible" if no finite coalition of privately informed agents can manipulate it by combining deception with hidden trades of exchangeable goods. Sufficient conditions for mutilateral compatibility are that all agents face the same linear prices for exchangeable goods and that indistinguishable agents face identical budget sets. The same conditions are necessary under assumptions that extend those under which the second efficiency theorem of welfare economics holds in a continuum economy. Markets for exchangeable goods emerge as binding constraints on the set of Pareto efficient allocations with private information. Copyright 1987 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 54 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0034-6527|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0034-6527|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:restud:v:54:y:1987:i:3:p:399-412. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.