Power Corrupts, but Can Office Ennoble?
This paper investigates the effects of increased power associated with higher office on the quality of agent performance, within the context of a model in which agents care about what others think of them. They care that is about the esteem they enjoy. The object is to conduct a simple comparative static exercise in the "economy of esteem", isolating the various dimensions of the relation between office held and esteem-related incentives to perform in a more estimable way. Copyright 2002 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Volume (Year): 55 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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