IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/kyklos/v47y1994i3p403-20.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcentralization

Author

Listed:
  • Eichenberger, Reiner

Abstract

In the economic literature on federalism, centralization is frequently identified with overall homogeneous policies, reactions in the post constitutional political process are often neglected, and comparative analysis is rarely carried out. This contribution presents some elements of a more comparative, process oriented approach. The citizens' incentives to make use of the voice and exit options are analyzed. Federalism strengthens both exit and voice. Centralization is endogenous: governments delegate tasks selfishly to higher levels, hence overcentralization may result. A future European constitution should, therefore, promote federalism in order to prevent endogenous overcentralization. This cannot be achieved without strengthening direct democracy. Copyright 1994 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Suggested Citation

  • Eichenberger, Reiner, 1994. "The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcentralization," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 403-420.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:47:y:1994:i:3:p:403-20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:47:y:1994:i:3:p:403-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley Content Delivery) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.