Fundamental Standards and Time Consistency
Recent literature showed that government intervention is important to overcome market failures in the choice of standards. This paper shows that even benevolent and well-informed governments may be unable to overcome such market failures if fundamental standards are concerned. Costs and benefits of changes in fundamental standards are asymmetrically distributed over generations. Intergenerational coordination aimed at changing a current standard will fail because of a time consistency problem. With a simple model and several examples from the history of conventions, the authors discuss the conditions that might help overcome the time inconsistency in standard changing policies. Copyright 1993 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 46 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
- Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 424-40, June.
- Blankart, C. & Knieps, G., 1991. "Path Dependence, Network Externalities and Standardization," Papers 439, Groningen State, Institute of Economic Research-.
- Homburg, Stefan, 1988. "Theorie der Alterssicherung," EconStor Books, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, number 92902, April.
- Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 822-41, August.
- Verbon, Harrie A A, 1986. "Altruism, Political Power and Public Pensions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(3), pages 343-58.
- Blankart, Charles B & Knieps, Gunther, 1993. " State and Standards," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 39-52, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:46:y:1993:i:4:p:545-68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.