Efficiency and Distribution in Greenhouse Negotiations
The authors analyze the international aspects of the greenhouse problem. The equity versus efficiency trade-off is examined by reducing the set of instruments to the allocation of abatement efforts over countries without the possibility of side payments. The traditional cost-effective allocation of abatement efforts is no longer necessarily optimal. The trade-off is illustrated empirically by combining the available cost and benefit estimates in a simplified two-period model with twelve regions in the world. In a second application, the authors follow an inverse optimum approach and compute the power weights implicit in actual agreements. Copyright 1993 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 46 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:46:y:1993:i:3:p:363-97. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.