The Evolution of Property Rights
A model of the "optimal commons" shows how property tenures result from the interaction of transactions costs among those people using a resource in common and the costs of excluding noncommoners. The model shows that, under some circumstances, demographic and economic growth will induce a change toward individual property, while under other circumstances, growth can lead toward common property. Empirical examples of these shifts are discussed. Collective governance institutions are critical to the process; in fact, changes in governance institutions can lead to property rights changes in the absence of changes in underlying economic factors. Copyright 1989 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Volume (Year): 42 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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