Fiscal Policymaking and the Central Bank Institutional Constraint
In recent years, a developing literature has concentrated on issues such as the influence of central bank independence on the conduct of monetary policy, and the connected issue as to whether the central bank accommodates government fiscal policy. Much less has been done, however, to investigate the reverse interaction: the extent to which central bank independence influences the formation of fiscal policy. Using pooled cross-section data for twelve industrialized countries over the 1961-83 period, this paper finds some support for the hypothesis that the government budget deficits and inflation performance are indeed both affected by the independence of the centr al bank. Copyright 1988 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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Volume (Year): 41 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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