Voting on Social Security: The Family as Decision-Making Unit
Pay-as-you-go financed social security systems imply transfers of life time income not only among generational cohorts, but also between fam ilies of different size and generational composition. Whereas previou s models of voting on social security in democratic societies focusse d on the first type of transfer and assumed homogeneity of interests within each generation, the authors treat the family as the relevant decision-making unit. It is analyzed how the results of majority voti ng on mandatory public pension and sickness funds depend on time pref erence, the overall rate of population growth, and the distribution o f children across families. Copyright 1987 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 40 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:40:y:1987:i:4:p:529-47. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.