Tax Rate and Government Expenditure
This article presents a model of government behavior. A central role is allocated to the own interests of politicians and bureaucrats. The interests of social groups outside t he government organization are taken into account by the government t hrough factors such as mobility between social groups and pressure. T his leads to the formulation of a so-called complex interest function which is maximized to determine the behavior of the government. It a ppears that the numerical strengths of the social groups that are act ively involved in the production process are determinant for the tax rate and the relative level of government expenditure. Copyright 1987 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 40 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:40:y:1987:i:3:p:349-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.