Revenge, Tax Informing, and the Optimal Bounty
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nir Dagan & Yossi Tobol, 2005. "Tax evasion, informants, and optimal auditing policy," Economic theory and game theory 021, Nir Dagan.
- Matthew Gould & Matthew Rablen, 2016. "Voluntary Disclosure Schemes for Offshore Tax Evasion: An Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 5750, CESifo Group Munich.
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- Cécile Bazart & Mickael Beaud & Dimitri Dubois, 2017. "Whistleblowing vs random audit: An experimental test of relative effciency," Working Papers 17-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier.
- VafaI, Kouroche, 2005. "Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 385-405, June.
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