IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jfinan/v59y2004i6p2531-2575.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • CHARLES KAHN
  • ANDREW WINTON

Abstract

Banks and related financial institutions often have two separate subsidiaries that make loans of similar type but differing risk, for example, a bank and a finance company, or a "good bank/bad bank" structure. Such "bipartite" structures may prevent risk shifting, in which banks misuse their flexibility in choosing and monitoring loans to exploit their debt holders. By "insulating" safer loans from riskier loans, a bipartite structure reduces risk-shifting incentives in the safer subsidiary. Bipartite structures are more likely to dominate unitary structures as the downside from riskier loans is higher or as expected profits from the efficient loan mix are lower. Copyright 2004 by The American Finance Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(6), pages 2531-2575, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:6:p:2531-2575
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=jofi&volume=59&issue=6&year=2004&part=null
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael Brei & Carlos Winograd, 2018. "Credit risk of foreign bank branches and subsidiaries in Argentina and Uruguay," EconomiX Working Papers 2018-12, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Nadine Gatzert & Hato Schmeiser, 2011. "On the risk situation of financial conglomerates: does diversification matter?," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 25(1), pages 3-26, March.
    3. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2012. "Nonrecourse financing and securitization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 659-693.
    4. Berger, Allen N., 2007. "Obstacles to a global banking system: "Old Europe" versus "New Europe"," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 1955-1973, July.
    5. Kolasinski, Adam C., 2009. "Subsidiary debt, capital structure and internal capital markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 327-343, November.
    6. Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Giacomo Calzolari & Alberto Franco Pozzolo & Micol Levi, 2010. "Multinational banking in Europe - financial stability and regulatory implications: lessons from the financial crisis," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 25, pages 703-753, October.
    7. Fiordelisi, Franco & Molyneux, Phil, 2010. "Total factor productivity and shareholder returns in banking," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 241-253, October.
    8. Stoughton, Neal M. & Zechner, Josef, 2007. "Optimal capital allocation using RAROC(TM) and EVA(R)," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 312-342, July.
    9. repec:eee:finana:v:54:y:2017:i:c:p:144-158 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Lóránth, Gyöngyi & Morrison, Alan, 2003. "Multinational Bank Regulation with Deposit Insurance and Diversification Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 4148, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Gong, Di & Huizinga, Harry & Laeven, Luc, 2015. "Nonconsolidated subsidiaries, bank capitalization and risk taking," CEPR Discussion Papers 10992, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Westman, Hanna, 2011. "The impact of management and board ownership on profitability in banks with different strategies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3300-3318.
    13. Calzolari, Giacomo & Loranth, Gyongyi, 2011. "Regulation of multinational banks: A theoretical inquiry," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 178-198, April.
    14. Gong, Di & Huizinga, Harry & Laeven, L.A.H., 2017. "Nonconsolidated Affiliates, Bank Capitalization, and Risk Taking," Discussion Paper 2017-003, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. repec:eee:jbfina:v:88:y:2018:i:c:p:208-224 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. repec:eee:quaeco:v:67:y:2018:i:c:p:255-272 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M., 2008. "Bank capital structure and credit decisions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 295-314, July.
    18. Michael Brei & Carlos Winograd, 2012. "Foreign banks, corporate strategy and financial stability: lessons from the river plate," PSE Working Papers halshs-00703738, HAL.
    19. Elisa Luciano & Clas Wihlborg, 2013. "Financial synergies and the Organization of Bank Affiliates; A Theoretical Perspective on Risk and Efficiency," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 322, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2014.
    20. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjolein Schmeits, 1996. "Market Discipline in Conglomerate Banks: Is an Internal Allocation of Cost of Capital Necessary as an Incentive Device?," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-39, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    21. Michael Brei & Carlos Winograd, 2012. "Foreign banks, corporate strategy and financial stability: lessons from the river plate," Working Papers halshs-00703738, HAL.
    22. Marinč, Matej & Rant, Vasja, 2014. "A cross-country analysis of bank bankruptcy regimes," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 134-150.
    23. James B. Thomson, 2010. "Cleaning up the refuse from a financial crisis: the case for a resolution management corporation," Working Paper 1015, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:6:p:2531-2575. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/afaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.