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Cash and Corporate Control

Author

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  • OLUBUNMI FALEYE

Abstract

The takeover market is often suggested as appropriate for containing the agency problems of excessive corporate cash holdings. However, recent studies report contradictory evidence. I focus on the takeover-deterrence effects of corporate liquidity and suggest the proxy contest as an effective alternative control mechanism. I find that proxy fight targets hold 23% more cash than comparable firms, and that the probability of a contest is significantly increasing in excess cash holdings. Proxy fight announcement return also is positively related to excess cash. Following a contest, executive turnover and special cash distributions to shareholders increase, while cash holdings significantly decline. Copyright 2004 by The American Finance Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Olubunmi Faleye, 2004. "Cash and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(5), pages 2041-2060, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:5:p:2041-2060
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Boubaker, Sabri & Derouiche, Imen & Lasfer, Meziane, 2015. "Geographic location, excess control rights, and cash holdings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 24-37.
    2. Najah Attig & Sadok El Ghoul & Omrane Guedhami & Sorin Rizeanu, 2013. "The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(2), pages 419-451, May.
    3. Pablo, Eduardo, 2009. "Determinants of cross-border M&As in Latin America," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(9), pages 861-867, September.
    4. Nicole Boyson & Robert Mooradian, 2011. "Corporate governance and hedge fund activism," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 169-204, July.
    5. Humphery-Jenner, M., 2011. "High Frequency Trading, Information, and Takeovers," Discussion Paper 2011-047, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Faleye, Olubunmi, 2007. "Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 501-529, February.
    7. Schauten, M.B.J. & van Dijk, D.J.C. & van der Waal, J-P., 2008. "Corporate Governance and the Value of Excess Cash Holdings of Large European Firms," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2008-027-F&A, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    8. Brunarski, Kelly R. & Campbell, T. Colin & Harman, Yvette S., 2015. "Evidence on the outcome of Say-On-Pay votes: How managers, directors, and shareholders respond," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 132-149.
    9. Boubaker, Sabri & Cellier, Alexis & Rouatbi, Wael, 2014. "The sources of shareholder wealth gains from going private transactions: The role of controlling shareholders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 226-246.
    10. Mª Belén Lozano García, 2011. "Analyzing the Effect of Excess Cash Accumulation on Financial Decisions," Post-Print hal-00704672, HAL.
    11. repec:eee:jbrese:v:83:y:2018:i:c:p:160-172 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Matthew Hill & Kathleen Fuller & G. Kelly & Jim Washam, 2014. "Corporate cash holdings and political connections," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 123-142, January.
    13. Arnold, Marc, 2014. "Managerial cash use, default, and corporate financial policies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 305-325.
    14. repec:spr:fininn:v:1:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1186_s40854-015-0013-6 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Dittmar, Amy & Mahrt-Smith, Jan, 2007. "Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 599-634, March.
    16. Orens, Raf & Reheul, Anne-Mie, 2011. "Do CEO Demographics Explain Cash Holdings in SMEs?," Working Papers 2011/35, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    17. Gormley, Todd A. & Matsa, David A., 2016. "Playing it safe? Managerial preferences, risk, and agency conflicts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 431-455.
    18. repec:eee:advacc:v:39:y:2017:i:c:p:79-90 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Harford, Jarrad & Mansi, Sattar A. & Maxwell, William F., 2008. "Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 535-555, March.
    20. Elnahas, Ahmed M. & Hassan, M. Kabir & Ismail, Ghada M., 2017. "Religion and ratio analysis: Towards an Islamic corporate liquidity measure," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 42-65.
    21. repec:kap:rqfnac:v:49:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11156-016-0606-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Orens, Raf & Reheul, Anne-Mie, 2013. "Do CEO demographics explain cash holdings in SMEs?," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 549-563.
    23. repec:bla:stratm:v:38:y:2017:i:2:p:415-435 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. repec:eee:corfin:v:49:y:2018:i:c:p:15-31 is not listed on IDEAS

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