Insuring Banks Against Liquidity Shocks: The Role of Deposit Insurance and Lending of Last Resort
It has long been recognized that banks' simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure. Because a system failure is costly, this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements, including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance (DI), to insure banks against liquidity shocks. These arrangements have proven themselves very successful, but they have also been the source of problems. Researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements, but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed. This paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks, a lender of last resort and DI, and compares the design of these arrangements across countries. The paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2006.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 20 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0950-0804|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0950-0804|