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Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments

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Listed author(s):
  • Gartner, Manfred

Abstract

The paper surveys political macroeconomics, covering its development from Rogoff's conservative central banker to the most recent discussions of monetary policy and institutional design. Topics include the inflation-stabilization trade-off, central bank independence with escape clauses and overruling with costs, inflation targets, performance contracts for monetary authorities, and the consequences of output persistence for these issues. Further topics are the political business cycle when output is persistent, the political macroeconomics of fiscal policy, the government spending bias, and the game-theoretic interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. All work is discussed within a coherent analytical framework. Copyright 2000 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd

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Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.

Volume (Year): 14 (2000)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 527-561

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:14:y:2000:i:5:p:527-61
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  26. Gartner, Manfred, 1997. "Time-Consistent Monetary Policy under Output Persistence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 429-437, September.
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Cited by:

  1. Manfred Gärtner, 2006. "The political economy of monetary policy conduct and central bank design," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-25, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  2. Agustin Alonso-Rodriguez, 2002. "Prices and interest rate behavior in the European Monetary Union: The first 18 months," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 8(4), pages 287-295, November.
  3. Muscatelli, Anton & Trecroci, Carmine, 2000. " Monetary Policy Rules, Policy Preferences, and Uncertainty: Recent Empirical Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(5), pages 597-627, December.
  4. repec:kap:iaecre:v:8:y:2002:i:4:p:287-295 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Gertrudes Saúde Guerreiro & António Caleiro, 2003. "Explaining the Election Results in Portugal: A Spatial Econometrics Point of View," ERSA conference papers ersa03p523, European Regional Science Association.
  6. Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January.
  7. Manfred Gärtner, 2002. "Monetary policy and central bank behaviour," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 2002-24, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  8. Fabrizio Carmignani, 2003. "Political Instability, Uncertainty and Economics," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 1-54, February.
  9. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2005. "Welfare and Distribution Effects of Bank Secrecy Laws," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 2005-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  10. Gernot Sieg & Irem Batool, 2012. "Pakistan, Politics and Political Business Cycles," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 51(2), pages 153-166.
  11. Gebhard Kirchgassner, 2002. "The effects of fiscal institutions on public finance: a survey of the empirical evidence," Chapters,in: Political Economy and Public Finance, chapter 9 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  12. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Bartolomeo, 2013. "The Cost Of Social Pacts," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 238-255, 07.
  13. Caleiro, António, 2009. "How upside down are political business cycles when there is output persistence," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 22-26, March.

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