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The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors

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    This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post-takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex-post settling-up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats. Copyright (c) 2008 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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  • , 2009. "The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1-2), pages 185-209.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:36:y:2009-01:i:1-2:p:185-209
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua Porter & Harminder Singh, 2010. "What Factors Drive Takeovers in Australia?," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 9(2), pages 87-103, August.
    2. Tristan Auvray & Olivier Brossard, 2013. "French connection: interlocking directorates and the ownership-control nexus in an insider governance system," CEPN Working Papers hal-00842582, HAL.
    3. Field, Laura & Lowry, Michelle & Mkrtchyan, Anahit, 2013. "Are busy boards detrimental?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 63-82.

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