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Consistency of UK Pension Fund Investment Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Gavin Brown

    (PanAgora Asset Management Ltd, London,)

  • Paul Draper
  • Eddie McKenzie

Abstract

"Transition matrix techniques are used to relate the past and present performance of pension fund portfolios. In particular, funds are ranked to study the tendency of portfolios to remain in the same quartile of the ranking as they were in the previous period. For raw returns, funds in both of the top quartiles are found to be more likely to remain in the same quartile than would be expected by chance. This result can be taken as limited evidence for the consistency of performance. Similar systemic effects are observed on a risk-adjusted basis. There appears to be clear evidence that some fund managers can offer a degree of consistent good performance." Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997.

Suggested Citation

  • Gavin Brown & Paul Draper & Eddie McKenzie, 1997. "Consistency of UK Pension Fund Investment Performance," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 155-178.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jbfnac:v:24:y:1997-03:i:2:p:155-178
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    Cited by:

    1. Whitehouse, Edward, 2000. "Pension reform, financial literacy and public information: a case study of the United Kingdom," MPRA Paper 10323, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Juan Carlos Matallín-Sáez & Amparo Soler-Domínguez & Emili Tortosa-Ausina, 2014. "On the robustness of persistence in mutual fund performance," Working Papers 2014/01, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    3. Carmen-Pilar Mart¨ª-Ballester, 2012. "A Comparative Analysis of the Performance of Collective Investment Institutions," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 2, pages 43-52, May.
    4. Anastasia Petraki & Anna Zalewska, 2013. "With whom and in what is it better to save? Personal pensions in the UK," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 13/304, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    5. Gregory, Alan & Tonks, Ian, 2004. "Performance of personal pension schemes in the UK," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24698, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Fabrice Hervé, 2003. "La persistance de la performance des fonds de pension individuels britanniques:une étude empirique sur des fonds investis en actions et des fonds obligataires," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, pages 41-77.
    7. Anastasia Petraki & Anna Zalewska, 2017. "Jumping over a low hurdle: personal pension fund performance," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 153-190, January.
    8. Fletcher, Jonathan & Forbes, David, 2002. "An exploration of the persistence of UK unit trust performance," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 475-493, December.
    9. Matallín-Sáez, Juan Carlos & Soler-Domínguez, Amparo & Tortosa-Ausina, Emili, 2016. "On the robustness of persistence in mutual fund performance," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 192-231.
    10. Petr Parshakov, 2014. "Russian Mutual Funds: Skill vs. Luck," HSE Working papers WP BRP 40/FE/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    11. repec:eee:ecofin:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:654-667 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Anastasia Petraki & Anna Zalewska, 2013. "Jumping over a low hurdle: Personal pension fund performance," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 13/305, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    13. Manuel Ammann & Andreas Zingg, 2008. "Investment Performance of Swiss Pension Funds and Investment Foundations," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 144(II), pages 153-195, June.

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